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Resumen: El propósito del trabajo es doble: por un lado, 
presentamos un modelo descentralizado de 
política fiscal donde hay una "falla de 
coordinación". Por el otro, tratamos de probar 
empíricamente dicha teoría basados en las ex-
periencias recientes de Argentina y Gran 
Bretaña. 
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we 
present a model of decentralized fiscal policy-
makingwhere a "coordinationfailure" problem 
arises. Second, we make an effort in order to empiri-
cally test this approach by developing an em-
pirical investigation based on the recent 
experience of two countries: Argentina and 
Great Britain. 
1. Introduction 
Is has long been recognized that fiscal policies, and in particular public 
deficits, are partially associated with redistributive measures carried out by 
the government.
1 Nevertheless, it is only recently that formal models have 
been developed where redistributive issues play a major role in determining 
government fiscal policies. A crucial methodological change that prompted 
the indicated development was the abandonment by this literature of the 
* I thank the comments received from Daniel Heymann, Miguel Savastano, Julio 
Santaella, Ivan Alonso and Eduardo Siandra. As usual, the remaining errors are mine. 
1 See, for example, Hirsh and Goldthorpe (1978) and Hirschman (1980 and 1985). 
Also, Lindert (1989) presents long-term data for Great Britain and the United States of 
America in order to highlight the closed association between the size of the public sector 
and distributive policies carried out by the government. 
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"representative individual" paradigm,
2 and its replacement by heterogeneous-
type and/or decenrralized-policy-making frameworks where fiscal policies 
are derived from the solution of a noncooperative game, describing a conflict 
of interest among various majorities or constituencies. 
The Political Economy literature, on one hand, emphasizes that the 
introduction of explicit political institutions like elections (or just the recog-
nition of a possible future government change), induces an "intertemporal 
myopia" on the part of the incumbent government such that the latter does 
not fully internalize all future cost of its present fiscal decisions.
3 An appealing 
prediction derived from this analysis is that political instability -loosely 
defined as frequency of government change- and political polarization -a 
measure of the degree of preference disagreement among individuals/groups-
make fiscal policies become more unstable and socially inefficient. For example, 
a tendency toward a too high level of public sector deficits, and rising inflation 
for the case of developing countries, develops.
4 
On the other hand, other papers have emphasized that the decentralized 
character of many fiscal decisions coupled with a bad institutional design, 
may constitute a very important cause of bad fiscal performance.
5 The 
presence of externalities caused by the closed interdependence among dif-
ferent government jurisdictions, may generate a "coordination failure" problem 
in which welfare gains accruing to all individuals/groups cannot be realized 
due to the impossibility of the central authorities (or other political institu-
tions, i.e. legislatures) to impose a cooperative arrangement. 
A general problem with this coordination-failure literature is that the 
supposed weakness that the central authorities are subject to is often left 
unexplained. Moreover, in most of these papers the fiscal regimes that are at 
least theoretically possible are just two: Either the economy is in its PO 
cooperative equilibrium, or in the non-cooperative inefficient one.
6 But, of 
course, real-world experiences do not picture such an extreme dichotomy 
feature. 
2 As it is well-known, in representative-agent models, fiscal policies and, in 
particular, government deficits arise as a consequence of a tax smoothing behavior from 
the part of the representative individual/government. See, for example, Barro (1979, 
1986 and 1989), Lucas (1986) and Lucas and Stockey (1983). 
3 See, for example, Alesina- Tabellini (1990), Tabellini and Alesina (1990), Cukier-
man et al. (1991), Persson and Svensson (1989) and Cukierman and Meitzer (1989). 
4 An application of this political-economy approach to the case of developing 
countries can be found in Edwards and Tabellini (1991a, b). 
5 See, for example, Aizenman (1989), Aizenman and Izard (1990a, b) and Sangui-
netti (1990). 
6 In Sanguinetti (1990) an intermediate regime is presented in which the central 
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The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we present a model of 
decentralized fiscal policy-making where a "coordination failure" problem 
arises. Second, we make an effort in order to empirically test this approach 
by developing an empirical investigation based on the recent experience of 
two countries: Argentina and Great Britain. 
With respect to the model, we go one step further with respect to the 
existing literature by providing an explanation of why, and under what 
circumstances, the central authorities may find themselves in a "weak" 
position, not being able to impose a Pareto-improving policy. For developing 
this extension we borrow from the political economy literature the idea of 
preference (political) polarization. In the case of our model, this polarization 
takes places between the constituencies ruling, contemporaneously, at 
the federal and local levels of government. It is found that differences in the 
composition of the political coalitions ruling at each government jurisdictions 
give local authorities incentives to behave in an opportunistic way, trying to 
extract transfer payments from the Federal Government. At the same time, 
with greater polarization the federal authorities find more costly to resist to 
the indicated "free raider" behavior from the part of the local authorities. 
Overall then, public sector fiscal performance worsened with inter-jurisdic-
tional political polarization. 
Though theoretically plausible, the approach seems to contradict the 
common-sense idea that central government authorities will tend to favor 
those local governments with similar preferences (political affiliation) of 
its own, and try to penalized those of opposite political orientation. This 
idea is especially appealing for those periods in which the proximity of 
local elections make the Federal authorities willing to support its politi-
cally-closed local governments in other to improve their reelection chan-
ces.
7 Though this intuition may be enough to explain the experience of 
certain countries in some periods, the case of the countries we describe 
below teaches that this is not the only "politics" that intergovernmental 
transfers are subject to. In particular, the regression analysis indicates that 
both in Argentina and Great Britain, local governments ruled by opposi-
tion parties have received on average higher transfers per capita from the 
federal government than those run by the party ruling at the federal 
level. Thus, without neglecting the importance of the indicated "office 
motivated" approach, we think it could be interesting to explore this other 
polarization idea. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic 
structure of the model. In Section 3 we solve it for the case of extreme political 
7 This "office" motivated approach is emphasized in Weingast et al. (1981) and 
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polarization where the local and federal governments are identified with a 
particular (and opposite) constituency. Section 4 derives the results for the 
general case in which more "balanced" political coalitions are allowed to form 
both at the local and federal levels of government. Section 5 presents the 
empirical analysis for the cases of Argentina and Grat Britain. Finally, Section 
6 concludes with some general comments. 
2. The Structure of the Model 
We are going to work with a two-period model economy composed by N 
regions each of them inhabited by two types of individuals: np P-type and 
nR fl-type. For simplicity, we normalize total population in each region to 
one, so that np + nR = 1.
8 Preferences for both types of house hold are given by, 
U
i = c
i + $d< i = P,R (1) 
where c' and S denote consumption in period 1 and 2, respectively, by type 
i individual. Households are assumed to be risk neutral (linear utility func-
tion).
9 Individuals are different only in terms of the share of total regional 
output that are entitled to in each period. Thus, we are going to assume that 
the fl-type receives a greater share of the local output than the P-type.
1
0 In 
addition to the fixed output level, disposable income in period 1 comprises a 
transfer payment (gift) received from the local government (LG). In the second 
period, disposable income includes the endowed level of output net of an 
income tax charged by the federal government (FG), plus the receipts from 
savings which are also subject to a capital tax charged by the local authorities. 
We assume both taxes are distortionary. Hence, the budget constraints for 
both types of households who, say, live in region j, are given by, 
b
i + & = e?Yj + g (2.a) 
di = JYjil -1) -fitjYp + fc'flfc(l - a;) - apjbjRb (2.b) 
8 Migration across regions is assumed away. 
9 The reason for this assumption is that it rules out the possibility that public 
borrowing emerges as a consequence of differences between the intertemporal elasti-
city of substitution and the interest rate. 
1
0 The proposed heterogeneity scheme is similar to the one presented in Prati 
(1990b). Also, in Alesina and Tabellini (1989) an heterogeneity-type model along similar 
lines the one presented here is developed to study issues in taxation and capital flight. THE POLITICS OF TRANSFERS AND DEFICITS  91 
where 
i = P, R. 
e' = Share of total local output owned by the representative individual of type 




R = {\ - a
p) /{\ - n
p) where a
p is the 
share of local output owned by all P-type households taken together.
1
1 
Yj = Total output of region/ 
V = Debt purchases by type! individual. 
g' = Transfer payment (gift) received by type i individual from the local 
government of region/ 
t = Proportional income tax charged by the federal government. 
/(.) = Convex function that reflects the distortionary cost of federal income 
taxation. 
b. = Total debt issue by the; local government. 
Rb = (1 + rb) = Real interest factor on local public debt. 
o. = Local tax on capital (or tax on savings). 
a.j = Inefficiency parameter measuring the dead-weight cost of the local tax 
on capital in region j. 
There is a two-tier governmental system with a Federal and N Local 
jurisdictions. Preferences of both types of governments will differ depending on 
the weight that each type of individual receives in the respective preference 
function. These weights try to capture the representation of each constituency at 
the two government jurisdictions (the composition of the "political coalition"). 










p + (\ -w
F)U
R (3.b) 
Local governments' expenditure consist of a gift g' to each type of 
household. To finance these expenditures the authorities of region ; issues 
debt, bj, which is sold in the local market.
1
2 In the second period the debt is 
repaid using either a transfer from the federal government, 7}, or using 
resources from a local capital tax. Hence, the budget constraints of the j LG 
in period 1 and 2 are given by, 
n
pg
p + (1 - n
p)g
R = bj (4.a) 
1
1 The assumption of an uneven distribution of income implies that 
0 < e
p < 1 < e
R. 
1
2 We are thinking of short term debt that need not be constituted by bonds with 
a well established market. Credit from local government suppliers could do as well. 92  ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
(4.b) 
The federal authorities in the second period finances the transfers to all 
regions by charging a uniform country-wide income tax, 
For expositional purposes it is convinient to start analyzing the extreme case 
of preference (political) polarization where we have a P local government 
that cares only about the welfare of the P-type household (w
L = 1), and an R 




Before studying the optimization problem encountered by each govern-
ment jurisdiction, let's solve the consumption/saving decision faced by the 
representative household. Maximizing (1) subject to (2a) and (2b) we obtain 
an equation defining the ex-ante real interest rate as a function of the expected 
capital tax rate (assuming an interior optimum), 
Given the linear form of the preference function, the saving function is 
not well defined. Individuals will demand whatever (feasible) amount of 
debt, including zero, with the only condition that the ex-ante real return be 
equal to their rate of time preference.
1
4 Thus, we leave in the hands of the 
local government the decisions regarding the "optimal" quantity of debt and 
its distribution among the two groups of individuals (R and P). This assump-
tion allows us to isolate the distributive motive as the main determinant of 
local government deficits. 
The equilibrium concept to be used in the solution of the model is that of 
"Sequentially Rational Nash Equilibrium" (SRNE).
1
5 This implies that for each 
period and for all sequences of previous aggregate histories: 
1
3 In Section 4 we discuss both the case of extreme political polarization that is the 
opposite the one developed here (w
L = 0, = 1), and the more general case where 
preference weights take values strictly between zero and one. 
1
4 Nevertheless, the requirement that the interest rate be bounded from above, 
Rb < •», implies (using the Khun-Tacker conditions) that the demand for debt from thp 
consumer equals zero if 0"
c = 1. 
1
5 For a detailed account, see Persson and Tabellini (1991). 
N N 
± = R
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a) Both types of individuals maximize utility given the expected future 
equilibrium policy followed either by the local or the federal government. 
b) The policies chosen by both, the local and the federal government, are 
optimal given the expectations held by consumers and the expected future 
equilibrium outcomes. 
c) Private expectations are fulfilled. 
A very important assumption that will drive the results to be derived 
below refers to the timing of movements of each player. The following sketch 
illustrates the order in which the LG, consumers and the FG are assumed to move, 
Period 1  Period 2 
0 LG Consumers determine 
issues interest rate (expected 
debt capital tax rate) 
FG determines 
f and T (actual 
capital tax rate) 
The timing framework implies that the LG is a Stackelberg leader player 
with respect to both, the consumers and the FG. Note two consequences of 
this assumption. First, the FG is not able to precommit its policy. Instead, it is 
forced to choose its policy after observing the action taken by LGs and the real 
interest rate determined by consumers. Results would be very different if it 
is assumed that the FG can credibly predetermine its policy. In particular, the 
emergence of local deficits and of federal government's transfers as a conse-
quence of this type of redistributive game can eventually be avoided.
1
6 
Secondly, the LG issues debt before consumers (the market) determine the real 
interest rate. As we discuss below, the possibility that the LG can make this 
kind of commitments simplifies substantially the solution of the model.
1
7 
Besides, there are financial mechanisms through which public debt is 




6 For a model in which the FG is able to precommit its policy see Sanguinetti 
(1990). Also, a repeated-game version of this model may succeed in generating equili-
bria that resembles that of a precommitment regime. 
1
7 In particular, allows us to sort out the multiple equilibria problem that is a 
common feature of this type of game-theoretic, forward-looking models of public debt 
management. The seminal work in which this multiplicity of equilibria is identified is 
Calvo (1988). Also, in Alesina et al. (1990) a game-theoretic model of public debt 
management is developed to account for the recent Italian experience. Finally, Prati 
(1990b) emphasizes the commitment issue as crucial for the multiple equilibria feature. 
1
8 For example, the case of a government that, having a monetary control objective, 
announces a given amount of bonds to be sold and ask for interest rate offers. 94 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
3.1. The Problem of the Federal Government 
The SRNE equilibrium requires a backward solution of the model. Hence, in 
period 2, the FG faces the decision of whether or not to make the transfer 
payment to the LGs and, if it does make the transfer, it has to choose the 






RYn -1) -fite*Yp + b
RRb(\ - 0.) - a*oJb#„} 
S.t.: N N 
7=1 7=1 
bjRb = Tj + OjbjRb 
Note that in the second period both the amount of local debt, b., and the 
interest rate, Rb, are given from the point of view of the FG, since they were 
determined in period 1. Also, it is clear that by choosing t and Tv the FG is 
actually forcing the local government of region i to set a particular capital tax 
rate o> The following FOC is obtained by replacing the constraints into the 
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where 9 / (1 - n
p) is the portion of local government debt bi purchased by the 
type-7? representative individual.
2
1 Equation (7) has a straightforward 
economic interpretation. Faced with a given amount of debt issued by the LG 
of region i in period 1, the FG can adopt two alternative (though not exclusive) 
policies. First, it can collect tax revenues throughout the country and transfer 
the resulting resources to the indicated LG so that the latter may pay off the 
debt. Second, it can decide not to make the transfer and let the local government 
1
9 Recall that in this simplified scenario the FG cares only about the «-type 
household. 
2
0 The Kuhn-Tucker conditions also establish that in the case of a comer solutions, 
(7) will be satisfied as an inequality. 
2
1 This is given from the point of view of the FG in period 2. Below we see how 
this debt-composition parameter 6 is determined by the local government in period 1. THE POLITICS OF TRANSFERS AND DEFICITS 95 
of region i charge the capital tax to pay off the debt.
2
2 The above condition 
says that the FG would choose a combination of the two policies such that, at 
the margin, the cost of using both taxes are equalized. In this sense, the term 
on the left hand side of (7) measures the cost suffer, all across the country, by 
type-/? individuals (the only group the FG cares about), as a consequence of 
a small increase in the federal tax t. Similarly, the term on the right-hand-side 
represents the marginal cost borne by the FG (again, in term of the consump-
tion-loss suffer by type-/? individual) of increasing the local capital tax rate 
in region i. 
From the solution of the consumer problem we know that 
Rb = 1 / (3(1 - (f). Thus, Rb in (7) already incorporates the capital tax expecta-
tions formed by individuals in period 1. It can now be asked what is the level 
of LG debt such that private expectations are always fulfilled, meaning that 
ex-post the FG finds optimal to set o,. = of. Replacing (6) in (7) such a level of 
debt, b* , i=\,...,N, would be given by, 
At this level of debt, b*, we encounter a multiple equilibria situation in 
the sense that if the authorities of, say, region i in period 1 were to issue this 
amount of debt, the federal government will validated whatever capital tax 
expectation the market (all consumers together) chooses.
2
3 
However, it is seen that if b^b] the above multiple equilibria feature 
disappears. For example, if bi > b* the only way in which condition (7) can be 
satisfied is if a, > of, i.e. the actual capital tax rate exceeds the expected one. 
But, if people anticipate this behavior, they will revise up their initial expec-
tations which, in turn, will lead the FG to ex-post increase o even more. Of 
course, this process will imply that the only consistent expectation that 
households will form about 0; when bt > b* , is of = G,= 1, for which (7) is 
satisfied as an inequality.
2
4 But if this is the case people will not demand any 
debt in the first place.
2
5 Therefore, bi > b* can not be an equilibrium that the 
2
2 Given that there is no other asset but LG debt, this tax on capital holdings can 
be interpreted as an outright default from the part of the LG. 
2
3 We are being loose here when we mention the word "equilibrium". We did not 
yet showed that b*i is the overall SRNE equilibrium level of debt. Thus, this multiplicity 
result and the static comparative outcome to be derived below should be taken as 
preliminary results to be useful once we establish that b* is the overall solution to the 
model. 
2
4 Recall note 20. 
2
5 Recall note 14. 96 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
LG of region i would choose in the event that he actually wants to spend.
2
6 In 
other words, b* represents the maximum level of local government deficit 
that, given private sector expectations about the local capital tax, the FG is 
willing to "bail out" through a transfer. 
On the other hand, if bi < b\, condition (7) implies that a; < cr?, i.e. the FG 
would induce the LG to set the local tax rate below the expected one. Applying 
a similar reasoning as the one sketched before, it is concluded that the only 
expectation that the FG will ex-post fulfill when bt <b* is cr? = o,. = 0.
2
7 
In order to find an explicit expression for b* it will be convenient to make 
two additional assumptions. First, let's postulate/(*) = 1 / 2T
2 and second, 
assume all regions are identical. Under this circumstances, b* takes the 
following form, 
The above expression is positive under very general conditions.
2
8 
Moreover it easy to see that the more inefficient the local tax system becomes 
(a increases), the higher will be the indicated upper limit for local debt.
2
9 
The analysis developed so far seems to suggest that b* -the maximum 
amount of local debt that the FG is willing to "bail-out" through a transfer-
is a natural candidate for an overall equilibrium of the model. This level of 
debt (transfer) satisfies two of the indicated conditions for a SRNE equilibrium: 
The FG chooses its policy optimally (condition (7) is satisfied), and private 
expectations are fulfilled. Nevertheless, remains to be established that issuing 
that amount of debt is optimal from the point of view of the local government 
in period 1. We deal with this issue in the next section. 
3.2 The Problem of the Local Government 
In order to see whether the local authorities find in their own interest to issue 
debt up to the level the federal government is ex-post willing to sustain, lets 
consider how the welfare of the local government varies with the level of 
indebtness. The following indirect utility function depicts the welfare of the 
2
6 We prove this statement below, when we show that the welfare of the LG is 
monotonically increasing with respect to the level of debt. 
2
7 Again, in this case condition (7) will be satisfied as an inequality. 
2
8 A sufficient condition is given by 8> (1 -oP), which implies that all R-type 
individuals together should hold a proportion of the local debt at least equal to their 
share in local output. As it will turn out, in equilibrium 9 = 1. 
» Formally, 5b' / 5a = p>*)
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V{bi, bi .) = e
pYi + + ß[e
/>/'!.( 1 
Two issues arise from the above expression. First, the noncooperative 
game played among local governments implies negative externalities that 
they impose on each other (5V/ 8bj < 0 for j * i). The basic problem being that 
the transfer received from the FG by one region is financed with taxes charged 
all across the country.
3
1 Hence, an attempt at a redistributive policy within a 
given locality (a gift to the preferred constituency) generates also redistribu-
tive payments across regions. Second, it is seen that if the local government 
is interested in maximizing the welfare of its constituency (P-type), it may not 
be optimal to set b{ = b* since at this level of debt, and depending on market 
expectations, the representative individual may be subject to dead-weight 
costs of local taxation in the case the local government is forced to tax savings 
in period 2. But, as the analysis of the last section showed, if the LG offers for 
sell an amount of debt just a little lower than b*, say b* - %, it will be possible 
to coordinate individuals expectations such that the aggregate (market) level 
for <f equals zero. Now, even if the local government sells debt for amount 
equal to b*, the possibility arises for market expectation to behave in such a 
way as to make = 0. Assuming an equal probability value to each possible 
realization of the aggregate (market) capital tax expectation o
e, it is concluded 
that setting b- = b* - % is welfare improving (in expected utility terms) when-
ever i,<a.b*/2. In the analysis that follows we assume this condition is 
satisfied, justifying the indicated inequality restriction in (10).
3
2 
Maximizing (10) over bi and imposing the symmetry assumption (all 
regions are identical), we obtain an expression for b", the level of debt that 
the local government finds optimal to issue assuming no local tax is charged, 
b** = $
n^[^;-l}>0 (11) 
Comparing (9) and (11) it is easy to show that b" > b* for N> 2. There-
fore, the local authorities will do find optimal to set b = b* - %, given that their 
bliss point (b**) is located to the right of b\ Moreover, as we see from equation 
3
0 For expositional purposes, let's assume again that regions are not identical. 
3
1 The presence of these externalities is at the core of the "Coordination Failure" issue. 
3
2 Alternative, zero capital tax expectations, C = 0, may constitute a "focal point" 
on which individuals expectations would coordinate. 
1 ZJ>]  l L
bj  I 
)-f(e
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(9), the equilibrium level of debt, b*, raises with 0, the share of local debt in 
the hands of type-P individuals. Hence, the local government of region i 
would set this parameter equal to one in order to increase the equilibrium 
level of transfer (gift) to its preferred P-type constituency (recall that 
g
p = (b* - ^)/n
p). The reason for this result is clear. By raising the amount of 
debt in the hands of the P-type individuals, the LG raises the ex-post cost for 
the FG (who cares only about this group) of not "bailing out" the local 
authorities, forcing the federal government to deliver the appropriate trans-
fers that allows them (LG) to pay off the debt without using their distortionary 
local tax. 
Summarizing the results obtained for this extreme political polarization 
scenario, we haves seen that the local governments will tend to sell debt to 
their opposite political constituencies (P-type) with the purpose of finance a 
gift to their most preferred group (P-type). The amount of debt will be just 
^-less the maximum amount the FG is ex-post willing to support through a 
transfer payment. This amount assures the LG that it will not need to use its 
distortionary capital tax when the debt falls due. This equilibrium level of 
debt (transfer) is positively associated with the degree of inefficiency of 
the local tax system. Thus, local (short-term) debt and transfers from the 
FG arises in equilibrium both as a way of supporting inefficient local tax 
systems and also, out off a purely distributive origin; the linear form of 
the preference function implies that consumption in period 1 and 2 are 
perfect substitutes, therefore there is no special role for debt as a consump-
tion smoothing devise. 
4. Equilibrium in the Extended Model 
This section tries to assert the way in which the results derived before change 
when local and federal governments care about both constituencies. In par-
ticular, we want to investigate whether or not the level of the FG transfer to 
region i (7\) and the associated local government deficit (£>,) are affected when 
the "mix" defining government preferences (at the local and federal level) 
changes. In other words, we want to obtain some static comparative results 
regarding the "political coalition" parameters w
l and w
F, which were as-
sumed to be fixed (at 1 and 0 value, respectively) in the analysis carried out 
in the last section. The questions we want to address are the following: Does 
preference (political) polarization of the opposite kind the one analyzed in 
Section 3 ( so that now ^ = 0 and w
F= 1) support and equilibrium with 
positive FG's transfers and local government deficits?. Will local government 
deficit and transfers from the FG be zero if both Federal and Local govern-
ments have, loosening speaking, no distributive bias? THE POLITICS OF TRANSFERS AND DEFICITS 99 








s.t: d' = Yfil - 0 -/(te'Yj) + b'R^l - 0}) - apjbJRb , i = P,R 
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Solving the above problem using a procedure similar to the one employed 
in Section 3, we find the expression for the maximum level of local debt the FG is 










where the above equation is non-negative under very mild assumptions.
3
4 
Equation (14) shows that in this extended version of the model, the maximum 
FG-backed level of local debt bE depends, as in the case of the last section, on 








p, are also added as determinants of b*E. We say there 
is a distributive bias whenever the preference weights coefficients (w
F, h-*-) do 
not coincide with the population coefficients of the corresponding constituency. 
For example, if > rf we say that the FG has a redistributive bias towards 
the P constituency (or, alternatively, the P-constituency is "over-represented" 
in the federal government). 
3
3 The index E stands for "extended" model. 
3
4 A sufficient condition is, again, that 6 £ (1 - if). 100 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
We need to solve the problem of the local government in order to 
determine the actual level of debt (transfers from the FG) that is going to 














s.t.: b' + c' = e'Y+i  (13.a) 
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S
 v S' u






















From the set up of the problem it is clear the leader-player role the LG 
has in the policy game. When choosing its optimal policy, the LG already takes 
into account both the private sector and the Federal government reaction 
functions (condition (13.c) and (13.g), respectively). In particular, as we 
discuss in Section 3, under certain conditions, the local government of region 
s will not find optimal to issue debt such that the upper limit b* is achieved. 
By selling, say, b*-%,U can avoid the possibility the market coordinate in a 
"bad" equilibrium in which the local government is "forced" to use its 
distortionary capital tax. Thus, the range of positive values that local debt bs 
can take in equilibrium should be properly adjusted to reflect the indicated 
circumstances-condition (13.g). 
Replacing all but the last restrictions into the objective function, we can 
rewrite the problem of the local government as follows, 
35 Recall that sub-indices indicates region and supra-indices indicates type of 
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s.t.: 0 
Solving the above maximization problem we find the following FOCs, 
X*y
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p( 1 - w
L) - w
L{ 1 - nP)) < 0 (14.b) 
From (14.b) it is concluded that unless the local authorities have no 
distributive bias, i.e. w
L/n
p = 1 - wVl-n
p (which, in turn, implies that 
w
L = n
p), the LG will always make transfer payments only to its mostpreferred 
constituency. In particular, if the LG has a distributive biases toward the 
P-type constituency, i.e. w
L/n





R = 0. Exactly the inverse result will be found when the LG has a distributive 
bias toward the P-type constituency.
3
6 
Yet, we have to determine the level of debt that will prevail in equi-
librium. Imposing the symmetry assumption on (14.a) we can solve explicitly 
for b**, the level of debt the local authorities find optimal to issue assuming 
it will be entirely pay off by a transfer from the FG in period 2 (analogous to 
expression (11) of section 3), 
3
6 This is the consequence of the linear form of the social (LG) preferences. In more 
general set ups we should expect that both constituencies get positive transfers. 102 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
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(1 - n ) /r 
Similar to what was found in the case of the FG problem, it is seen that 
both, the income distribution and the distributive bias ratios help to determine 
b*p
7 Comparing (12) and (15) it is easy to establish that b*E* > b*E for N> 2. 
Thus, given that the bliss point of the LG is to the right of b*E, b*E* -E, 
constitutes again the (SRNE) equilibrium level of debt (transfer) in this 
extended version of the model. 
We are going to use the general solution of the model given by expression 
(12) to study two other special cases (besides the one presented in section 3). 
First, a situation where again we have an extreme political polarization, but 
with the opposite sign compared to the one we analyzed in the last section. 
Second, the case in which there is no distributive bias, neither at the federal 
nor at the local level of government. 
With respect to the first case, the "political" configuration implies that 
now we have an extreme F-type government at the Federal level (wF = 1) and 
extreme R-type administration at the local level (w
L = 0). Under these assump-







16)  a n 
which again is positive as gifts to the fl-type constituency will be maximized 
(recall that now the LG cares only about the fl-type group so that / = 0 and 
= (b* - / (1 - n
p)) when the LG in period 1 sets 9 = 0. This means that now 
the local government will take debts only with the P-constituency in order to 
make transfer payments (gifts) to the fl-type group. Thus, we see that even a 
political configuration of the opposite nature of that study in Section 3 supports 
a positive level of debt and of transfers from the Federal government. 
Finally, we want to analyze the case where no distributive bias exists. In 
this scenario the preference weights encounter at both levels of government 
are just equal to the population shares (i.e. w
L = w
F = n
p). In other words, each 
constituency has just the "right" representation at each level of government. 
Under this assumption expression (12) can be written as, 
3
7 Of course, as the above condition was derived under the assumption that no 
capital tax is charged, the efficiency parameter related to the local tax system (a) does 
not enter in the solution for b". THE POLITICS OF TRANSFERS AND DEFICITS  103 
(17) 
Looking at the above expression it is concluded that in this "non-politi-
cally" biased regime the local government has no incentives in trying to "exploit" 
its advantage as a first mover in the policy game. The only reason for the existence 
of debt and of transfers from the federal government is related to the inefficiency of 
the local capital tax (b* = 0 if a = 0). Under these circumstances regions with less 
efficient tax system tend to receive higher transfers from the federal government 
independently of political considerations. 
From the overall comparison of the three special cases that we have 
analyzed -equation (9), (16) and (17)-, we conclude that the equilibrium level 
of transfers from the FG to the LG are greater under the two extreme political 
polarization regimes. Thus, it can be established that political polarization 
across government jurisdictions increases the equilibrium level of local govern-
ment deficit and of FG's transfers regardless of which way polarization goes. 
5. Empirical Analysis 
In this section an effort is made in order to provide an empirical investigation 
on the determinants of intergovernmental transfers. From the outset we 
should indicate that, though the empirical investigation is inspired in, and 
tries to be consistent with the theoretical analysis developed in the previous 
sections, it is far from being a thoroughly test of the model presented earlier. 
In the statistical analysis that follows we are going to use data cor-
responding to two countries: Argentina and England. The reason behind the 
selection of the two mentioned nations lies partly in the availability of data, 
and partly in an priori presumption that political economy considerations of 
the type emphasized in the paper have played an important role in explaining 
intergovernmental transfers in those countries.
3
8 Besides, it seems interesting 
to compare the experience of a developing country with that of a developed 
nation in this area of intergovernmental fiscal relationships. 
The main emphasis will be to try to assess the empirical content of two 
hypothesis that were advanced in the theoretical analysis. First, the positive 
association between the inefficiency of the local tax system and transfers from 
the federal government. Second, the idea that political polarization between 
3
8 For the case of England, Bayoumi and Gordon (1991) already found that political 
considerations of the type emphasize here are an important determinant of local 
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the federal and local levels of government raises the amount of transfers 
received by local authorities beyond the level justified by the indicated 
local-tax efficiency critérium. 
Table 1 and 2 present the regression results for the cases of Great Britain 
and Argentina respectively. In both tables the dependent variable is defined 
as central government's transfers to local jurisdictions (countries in the case 
of Great Britain and provinces in the case of Argentina) in per capita terms. 
One type of regressor we have included in the equations is given by different 
variables measuring the relative degree of development of the various 
regions. The hope is that these variables can, at least indirectly, tell something 
about the degree of efficiency of the local tax system. In particular, we will 
assume that more developed regions have a more efficient tax system. In any 
case, the inclusion of these variables has also the objective of controlling for 
the well-known purpose of most intergovernmental transfer systems, which 
is, to help local governments of low income regions to provide a minimum 
level of public services and other public goods. 
Table 1 
England 1983-1984 
Dependent Variable: Transfers per Capita* 
1  2  3 












Dumlab  0.12 
(2.11) 
Shlabor  0.69 
(5.87) 
Shcons  -0.77 
(-4.14) 
R-Squared  0.78  0.88  0.84 
fi-Bar Squared  0.77  0.87  0.84 
F-Statistics  67  139.90  101.10 
N  39  39  39 
»i-statistics in parenthesis. 
Transfers per capita = Block Grant Claim per Capita in 1983-1984. 
Ratval = Actual Rateable Value in 1982 per head. 
Dumlab = Dummy variable: 1 when labor party has more than 50% of the seats in the Local 
Assembly. 
Shlabor = Labor Party's share of total seats in the Local Legislature. 
Shcons = Conservative Party's share of total seats in the Local Legislature. 
Source: Finance and General Statistics 1983/1984, CIPFA, Statistical Information Service and 
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Table 2 
Argentina: 1986 
Dependent Variable: Transfers per Capita* 
1  2  3  4 
Const  159.30  23.24  21.72  122.89 
(3.06)  (2.99)  (4.79)  (3.02) 
Develop 1  -1.15  -1.05  Develop 1 
(-3.01)  (-3.61) 
Develop 2  -1017.30  -734.60  Develop 2 
(-2.50)  (-231) 
GDP  -5.67  -14.13 
(-1.47)  (-5.48) 
Dumpol  15.03  14.55  6.16  Dumpol 
(2.85)  (2.61)  (1.32) 
Repeca  0.12  0.08  Repeca 
(7.00)  (3.77) 
^-Squared  0.52  0.34  0.75  0.74 
R-Bar-Squared  0.44  0.27  0.72  0.67 
F-Statistics  6.59  5.03  28.70  12.14 
N  22  22  22  22 
* t-statistics in parenthesis. 
GDP = GDP per captia in 1985. 
Develop 1 = Development index calculated by weighting qualtity of housing, number of cars 
per capita and educational skills, in 1980. 
Repeca = Provinces' Representatives (per capita) in the National Congress. 
Dumpol = Dummy variable: 1 if local governmet's party is different from that ruling at the 
federal level. 
Sources: Porto (1990) and World Bank (1989). 
The regressions also include political-economy variables that try to 
measure the degree of political polarization across level of governments. In 
general these variables will take the form of a dummy-type parameter that 
takes the value of 1 for that region in which the local government is dominated 
by a political constituency different from that ruling at the federal level. 
Table 1 shows that the regression results for the case of Great Britain 
during 1983-1984 seem to conform with the theoretical hypotheses. In equation 
1, the negative and significant coefficient for the RATVAL variable, measuring 
the total taxable value ( in per capita terms) in each region, indicates that 
central government transfer followed a strong distributive pattern where 
poor counties received higher transfers per capita than rich ones. As long as 
this taxable-value variable is positively correlated with the degree of efficiency of 
the local tax system, something that is not difficult to imagine, this result is 
consistent with the efficiency hypothesis indicated above. On the other hand, 
the positive and significant coefficient for the variable DUMLAB, which takes 106 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
the value of 1 for those counties where Labor-party representation in the local 
assembly is equal or higher than 50%, indicates that, other things constant, 
Labor-dominated counties received on average higher transfer per capita 
from the central Government (ruled by Conservatives) than Conservative-
dominated ones during this period. 
The above results do not change if instead of a dummy variable, we use 
directly the Labor party share of seats in the local assembly, SHLABOR, as 
independent variable (see equation 2). Moreover, the expected negative coef-
ficient is obtained in the case we replace SHLABOR by SHCONS, the Conser-
vative party share of seats in the local legislature (see equation 3). 
Table 2 shows that for the case of Argentina, similarly to that of England, 
transfer from the FG have also had a clear redistributive purpose. This is 
indicated by the negative and significant coefficients for DEVELOP1 and 
DEVELOP2 in equation 1. Both variables constitute alternative development 
measures for different provinces. Interestingly, the indicated redistributive 
pattern is reinforced once political economy variables are included into the 
regressions. Both the significance level of the above development variables 
and the overall explicative power of the regression increase when the 
DUMPOL variable -which takes the value of 1 for those provinces governed 
by political parties other than the one ruling at the federal level- is added in 
the regression. 
The strong positive and significant level of this DUMPOL variable sug-
gest, again, that in Argentina during this period political polarization across 
government jurisdictions played an important role in the allocation of federal 
transfers. 
Equation 2 of Table 2 shows the regression results when provincial GDP 
per capita is used as a measure of relative level of development. Though the 
GDP variable has the expect sign, it fails to pass the significance test. On the 
other hand, DUMPOL continues to have a positive and significant coefficient. 
When the number of representatives to the National Congress (in per capita 
terms), REPECA, is added in the regressions (see equation 3), the GDP variable 
become strongly significant and negatively associated with transfers per 
capita. Though the mentioned REPECA variable does not constitute a measure 
of political polarization, it nevertheless indicates that other political factors, 
related to a strong Province's representation at the National Assembly, af-
fected also the allocation of transfer during this period. 
Finally, when both political variables, DUMPOL and REPECA, are com-
bined into a joint regression (equation 4), the overall explicative power of the 
equation increases, though the colinearity between the two political variables 
affects the significance level of DUMPOL. 
Summarizing the empirical results found in the regressions, we conclude 
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has had a clear redistributive pattern where poor endowed localities received 
on average higher level of transfer per capita than richer ones. This result does 
not seem to be surprising as the very purposes of these transfers is to try to 
equalized across regions the quality and quantity of public goods supplied 
by local governments. 
What seems to be surprising is that political polarization have also 
affected the allocation of these transfers. In particular, in both countries 
regions that have local government dominated by political parties different 
from that at the federal level have received, on average, higher levels of 
transfers per capita than those of the same political affiliation. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper tries to show that political polarization between constituencies 
ruling at the local and federal levels of government can, under certain 
circumstances, raise the level of intergovernmental transfers beyond what can 
be justified by efficiency criteria. Theory and empirical evidence seems to 
support the proposition that this polarization effect can be important in 
explaining the behavior of federal government transfers to local jurisdictions. 
Is there any policy or normative implication that can be derived from 
the above analysis? As we stated earlier in the study, the basic issue behind the 
policy game is the lack of commitment from the part of the FG in the determina-
tion of transfers to local governments. Thus, policies or enforceable rules that 
somehow establish limits and specific criteria for the allocation of FG's trans-
fers (give the FG the advantage of "first mover") can, in principle, moderate 
the opportunistic behavior of LGs. On the other hand, the English case showed 
that even if those policies are implemented the problem may not be complete-
ly eradicated. Contrasting with the experience of Argentina in 1986, England 
in 1983-1984 had tough regulations which explicitly penalized those counties 
which expend beyond a pre-established target levels set by the Central 
authorities. This penalization took the form of a reduced amount of transfers 
(rate support Grant) to be allocated to the corresponding local government. 
Still, we saw that this scheme could not stop local authorities to behave in an 
opportunistic way. 
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